HE term "imitation" is not prominent in the vocabulary of criticism today. In such use as it still has, it serves to segregate the bad from the good in art rather more frequently than to set the boundaries of art. Yet as late as the eighteenth century imitation was the mark and differentia of the arts, or at least of some of them. To the critics of that century, literature and painting were imitative arts, and it was still important to debate whether or not music was an art of imitation.' The term had begun to slip into disrepute in writings on the philosophy of art even before critics of art found it cumbersome or inappropriate, and substitutes for it with more familiar philosophic justification have long since been found; if it does occa-1 Thus, James Harris, in the second of his Three treatises (first published in 1744) entitled "A discourse on music, painting, and poetry," treats poetry, painting, and music as three types of imitation differing in their media and modes of imitation (2d. ed. [17651, pp. 55 ff.), although he goes on to say that poetry disposes of the charm of "numbers" as well as imitation (p. 92) and music possesses, besides the power of imitation, the power of raising affections (p. 99), "whereas Painting has pretence to no Charm, except that of Imitation" (p. 92). Thomas Twining, on the other hand, in the dissertation "On poetry considered as an imitative art," which he prefaced to his translation of Aristotle's Poetica (first published in 1789), distinguishes four senses of imitation as applied to poetry: imitation by the sounds of the words, by description, by fiction, and by dramatic imitation; and he argues (2d ed. [18121, I, 35) that, since the last is the proper sense of imitation, it is incorrect to say that all poetry is imitation; only dramatic poetry is properly imitative. Moreover, in the second dissertation prefaced to his translation, "On the different senses of the word, imitative, as applied to music by the ancients, and by the moderns," Twining concludes his argument by quoting with approbation from James Beattie's treatise On poetry and music the statement that music should be striken off the list of the imitative arts (p. 91) and by maintaining further that painting, sculpture, and the arts of design in general are "the only arts that are obviously and essentially imitative" (p. 92).
the statement is false; not infrequently both ends are accomplished in a single dialogue. Of existent objects, Plato says,7 there are three things necessary for knowledge: the name (5voya), the reason (X6,yos), and the image (e8cwXov); knowledge and the object itself are apart from these. Whether or not Plato wrote the epistle in which those distinctions are made, his practice seems to conform to it. "For as yet," the Stranger says at the beginning of the Sophist," "we have in common concerning him only the name." He suggests that he and his interlocutor doubtless have the thing in mind as well; but they must come to an agreement concerning the thing by means of reason, not by the mere words without the reason. Somewhat later, in discussing angling, they arrive at agreement not only concerning the name but also concerning the reason or definition of the thing itself.9 But when the search for the Sophist grows into an inquiry into being and nonbeing, pursued by way of word and reason, the Stranger remarks that in the case of being, as in that of every single thing which is supposed to be one, we call the single thing by many names and treat it as many." Not infrequently the speakers in the Platonic dialogues have reason to complain of the opposite difficulty, that many things are found to have the same name. It is probable that no small part of Plato's distrust of the written word is caused by the margin of independence which obtains between words, things, and reasons but which can be controlled in conversation by a skilled dialectician.
In any case, to require Plato to conform to an Aristotelian conception of definitions or terms in which words are assigned univocal meanings would be to distort his inquiry and make nonsense of much of his dialectic. It is invalid criticism to point out that a term like "imitation" has many meanings in Plato, and for the same reason it is questionable defense of the Platonic position to resolve the many meanings into one.1 The word might be said to be defined in the t Epist. vii. 342A-B.
s Sophist 218C0.
g Ibid. 221B. 10 Ibid. 251A-B. Consequent on this relation of names to things, Socrates frequently reproaches his respondents for finding many things where one is sought (as in Meno 72A or 77A), or again he is reproached by them for changing the meanings of his terms (as in Gorgias 483A); and on the other hand, speakers are praised for reducing many or infinite things to one name and for finding appropriate names for each subdivision (as in Theaetetus 147C-148B).
11 J. Tate thus finds two kinds of imitation in the Republic: imitation in the literal sense, the mere copying of sensible objects; and imitation in an analogical sense, such that poetry in which imitation of this sort occurred could be considered non-imitative (" 'Imi-THE CONCEPT OF IMITATION 5 course of the dialogues, but it receives no fixed meaning. The discussion proceeds by applying things and reasons to the elucidation of words, and in that process "imitation" and all like words suffer extensions and limitations. Unless the list is made indefinitely long to include infinite possible meanings, it is hardly accurate to say that the word has "several senses." From one point of view, "imitation" has only one meaning in Plato; from another, it has infinite meanings.
The methodological considerations which are so prominent in the use of words, and which control their meanings in what Plato would call a strange and wonderful fashion, may be stated in a way that has excellent Platonic precedent by setting forth the things to which Plato applied the word "imitation" and the other words which Plato applied to the same things-the many words which are applied to one thing, and the many things to which one word is applied. Without such considerations, on the other hand, inasmuch as they underlie some of Plato's most esteemed devices for displaying the meanings of words, it is difficult to know how the Platonic doctrine of poetry (to mention only one application) can be stated, or how its relation to later theories can be estimated, or how the condemnations which Plato passed on poets can be judged. In one of its narrowest senses Plato used the word "imitation" to distinguish poetic styles into three kinds: pure narrative, in which the poet speaks in his own person without imitation, as in the dithyramb; narrative by means of imitation, in which the poet speaks in the person of his characters, as in comedy and tragedy; and mixed narrative, in which the poet speaks now in his own person and now by means of imitation.12 In the Repubtation' in Plato's Republic," in the Classical quarterly, XXII (1928], 23). In a later article ("Plato and 'imitation,' " ibid., XXVI [1932] , 161-69), Mr. Tate refers to this as a distinction between a good and a bad sense of the term "imitation": poetry which is imitative in the bad sense is excluded from the ideal state, while poetry which is imitative in the good sense can be called non-imitative rather than imitative, depending on the sense in which the term "imitative" is used. In this second article Mr. Tate finds support in the remaining dialogues for his earlier interpretation of imitation in the Republic. W. C. Greene contrasts the "literal kind of imitation" implied in the tenth book of the Republic with the imitation in the second and third books of the Republic which involves an attenuated form of the doctrine of ideas and which is criticized on ethical grounds in a not-unfriendly spirit ("Plato's view of poetry," in Harvard studies in classical philology, XXIX [1918] , 37-38). In Book x, according to Mr. Greene, Plato begs the question by assuming that the definition of imitation will cover the aim of poetry (p. 53). Imitation in its broadest sense was a metaphor to which Plato resorted, with evident dissatisfaction, to explain the relation of the world of sense to the world of ideas (p. 66). of it. Poetry, even false, is not an unmixed falsehood, but requires the antecedent lie for its explanation.14 The terms alternative to "imitation" (•$i-~rs) begin to make their appearance in the discussion of falsity. A lie occurs when one copies (dKw'ELw) the true nature of gods and heroes badly; it is comparable to a portrait which bears no resemblance (O6ota) to the painter's model.15 The argument concerning imitation may, moreover, be applied to the form in which it is itself stated, for the lie of the poet is explained by the image and likeness of the painter. Even at this early stage "imitation" may be applied to poetry in several senses; according to one, dramatic poetry is imitative of the speech of the characters; according to another, false poetry is imitative of a lie in the soul; according to a third, true poetry is imitative of the good. The lawgiver will lay down laws and patterns (rb'-ros) to which the poet will be required to conform ;6 and as soon as the philosopher is given his function in the perfect state, he too enters into the imitative process. He imitates the things which truly are and assimilates (ko<0oLtooGaOat) himself to them. He should, moreover, be compelled to mold (-xrdrrELy) human nature to his vision; no city is happy unless its lineaments have been traced by artists who used the heavenly model (irapa6Edypa and is contrasted to the maker of realities; unlike the latter he has no knowledge of being but only of appearances."s Both varieties of maker, moreover, stand in contrast to an eternal reality. Like the painter who paints the picture of a couch, the imitator makes a product at three removes from nature, for he imitates not that which is but that which seems to be, not the truth but a phantasm.19 Poetry, therefore, at that removal from truth, attains only a small part of the object, and the part it attains is not the object itself but an image (eldwXov) capable of deceiving. If the poet were able to produce the things he imitates instead of making only images, if he had knowledge of the truth, he would abandon imitation.20 Truth and falsity, knowledge and opinion, reality and appearance delimit at each step the scope of "imitation"; but as its application has varied, it has marked consistently a contrast between the work of imitation and something else which is, in comparison with it, real.
Even when limited to poetry and analogous activities, then, the concept of imitation may expand and contract. It may embrace a part of poetry, or all poetry, or even philosophy as well. But it also extends to other human activities. All the arts are imitative. The painter is comparable to the poet in his imitative character;21 a good picture is one which reproduces the colors and figures of its subject.22
Music is an imitation (AilLqot~), a representation (atrETKaoia), a copy 
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tion or the character of the object imitated, the standards in dance and song may be stated in moral terms: figures and melodies which are expressive of the virtues of body or soul, or of copies (ELKWP) of them, are good.25 Or the term "imitation" may be expanded in another direction from poetry. All verbal accounts, including the dialogues themselves, are imitations. At the beginning of the dialogue which bears his name, Critias remarks that all discourse is imitation (j4A7-o-s) and representation (a7eLcKaaLd); and he complains that his task is more difficult than the one that Timaeus performed, inasmuch as image-making (dEswXolroda) is subjected to closer criticism when it represents well-known human subjects than when it represents divine things in which we are content with a small degree of likeness.2" But in the Timaeus Socrates finds a difficulty in discourse almost the contrary to that of which Critias complained. To bring out the competence of the speakers in the succeeding dialogues, Socrates had been developing the contrast, in terms of the degree of their knowledge and the nature of their discourse, of philosophers and statesmen to the imitative tribe of poets and the wandering Sophists; the defects of his own presentation in the Republic, comparable to a defect he finds exemplified by the poets, arise from the fact that familiar things are easy to imitate, but what is unfamiliar is difficult to imitate in action and even more difficult in words." Moreover, the component parts of poems, discourses, and dialogues are imitations. Words imitate things in a fashion distinct from that of music or design,"2 and the letters of which words are composed are themselves means of imitation. From letters and syllables, the lawgiver forms a sign (ante7ov) and a name (ivoya) for each thing; and from names he compounds all the rest by imitation. In its expansion and contraction, the word "imitation" indicates the lesser term of the proportion of being to appearance: if God is, the universe is an imitation; if all things are, shadows and reflections are imitations; if the products of man's handicraft are, his representations of them are imitations. If imitation is to be avoided, it is because of the danger of imitating, through error, ignorance, or falsehood, that which is not or that which is less than it might be or is less than that which imitates it. As confined to the arts, therefore, imitation is not coextensive with the productive arts; rather, it is a part of them, for they are divided into those which produce things which are and those which produce images (E8twXov); the latter is the imitative art. Even when art is contrasted to nature and chance, the arts are divided into those arts which produce images (etoXbow), related to each other but bearing little relation to truth, like music and painting, and those arts which co-operate with nature, like medicine, husbandry, and gymnastic.35 The divine art suffers a like division, for in addition to natural objects which are the result of God's art, there are visions (0cavraapa) seen in dreams and waking, shadows Platonic dialogues, it is apparent that a great many similar terms undergo similar variations and approximate similar meanings in the succession of subjects on which imitation is brought to play. Several such terms have been necessary for the preceding exposition. Imitation is the making of images (E&aOXov). The art of image-making may produce copies (ELKC0V) or phantasms (q4?,rao'a), the difference between the two being that a copy is like its object, a phantasm is not. Yet a copy, to be correct, must not reproduce all the qualities of that which it copies. The painter makes a copy when he represents (dca~eLK&ELV) the color and form of his subject.45 The control of poetic copies was to be the specific object of the supervision of poets and other artisans in the third book of the Republic. They were to be compelled to embody in their work copies of the good and to be prohibited from setting forth copies of the evil.46 Similarly, the competent critic in any of the arts must know, first, what the copy is; second, how correctly it has been presented; third, how well it has been executed in words, melodies, and rhythms.47 Even philosophic arguments are copies, for the solution of the question, whether injustice is profitable to the completely unjust man, in the Republic, is arrived at by fash- 
ruined if one looked at the sun directly instead of at its copy in water or in something else of that sort;53 one should make one's thought clear by means of verbs and nouns, modeling (KrrvTroVP) opinion in the stream that flows through the lips as in a mirror or in water;54 the versatility of the imitative artist which produces the appearance, though not the reality, of all things is explained by comparison to a mirror;55 the liver is so fashioned that the power of thought, proceeding from the mind, moves in the liver as in a mirror which receives impressions (rbiros) and provides images (eabwXov), and the spleen is like a wiper for the mirror.56
Images and copies, however, as the metaphor would suggest, provide no satisfactory substitute for reality, though they are a necessary stage in the approach to reality. To understand the image we must know the reality; but to know the reality we must dispose of images. If there are copies (dK&v) of letters in water or in mirrors, we shall never know them until we know the originals, and we shall never be true musicians until we know the forms of temperance, courage, liberality, and the rest.57 He who studies things that are in arguments and reasons (X•6o') is as distinct from him who looks at them in copies (EdKL~') as he is from him who considers them in their operations and works (ip-yov).58 There are many variants to the figure. The mirror may even appear in a text in which the mind is like a block of wax,59 on which perceptions and thoughts are impressed (&drorvwrovoOat) like the imprint of signet rings (6aKTrvXMw o a7ea) ;60 they persist as memorial imprints in the soul ( is correct, from the specific doctrine of imitation to embrace the entire philosophy of Plato and from the process of imitation to the devices of dialectic. Even the figure of the divided line is in terms familiar to the doctrine of imitation, although the movement is from copies to reality rather than from reality to copies: all things are divided into the visible and the intelligible, and each of these parts in turn is divided into two classes. The first of the two classes of visible things is the class of copies (ElKcYV), which includes shadows (oKta) and reflections of phantasms in water (r& v '&ros i8aat 4avnrdaara).66 The second class of visible things is that of which the previous is a likeness or copy, that is, natural things, and the proportion between the likeness (6potLoOEP) and that of which it is a likeness is the proportion between the objects of opinion and the objects of knowledge. But the soul, when it comes to investigate the first portion of the intelligible part of the line, must treat as copies the things which were imitated in the first part of the line; it is for that reason that the geometer draws squares and diagonals.6' Once the discussion pursues this direction, it is only a step from "imitation" to the terms which guard the loftiest reaches of the Platonic dialectic, to recollection (Eidp'~ r- To elaborate the full significance of the term "imitation," consequently, more is required than the simple enumeration of the list of other words equivalent to it or used in its explication. Each of the terms of that lengthy list varies with the variation of "imitation." The set of significances employed in the dialogues may indeed be conceived as a huge matrix composed of all the words of a language, each possessed of an indefinite number of shades of meaning, the particular meaning of a word at any given time being determined by the meanings of other words drawn from that matrix in conjunction with which it is used. It is inevitable that the doctrine of imitation invade the philosophic enterprise and the dialectical method. All discourse is an imitation, and the interlocutors of the dialogues are constantly using, The criteria of good, true, and beautiful derive from the same proportion of being to appearance which operated throughout the doctrine of imitation. If the artificer of any object uses the uniform and eternal as his model, the object so executed must of necessity be beautiful; but if his model is a created object, his work so executed is not beautiful.'7 Discourse concerning the abiding and unshakeable should be, as far as possible, irrefutable and invincible; but accounts of that which is copied after the likeness of the model are themselves copies and possess only likelihood, for as Being is to Becoming, Truth is to Belief.76 In like manner and for like reason the Good gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing, and is itself more beautiful even than they." The pursuit of beauty does not follow a different path from that which leads to truth and goodness. It is no accidental consequence, therefore, and it is no evidence of an inexplicable insensitivity to poetry in a great writer, that poetry should fall so low in Plato's analysis or that the poet should have no place in the perfect state. Criteria of truth and morality are ap- plied as a natural course to the poet's work. He is permitted even in the ideal state to tell his tales, properly censured, as an incident of education and as a means of inculcating virtue. He may tell tales concerning the gods, to teach men "to honor the gods and their fathers and mothers, and not to hold their friendship with one another in light esteem";78 he may tell tales concerning heroes to inspire the virtues of courage and self-control or temperance; but the discussion of the one remaining subject of his tales, men, is interrupted because justice would properly be inculcated by such tales, and, since the nature and value of justice has not yet been determined in the dialogue, instructions concerning the limitations of his poems are not yet ready for the poet.79 Before that is possible the one remaining virtue, wisdom, which is left for expression to the scientist and the dialectician, since the poet can make no contribution to it, must be examined. If then one seeks tales about men, that is, tales by which men may learn justice, the Republic itself is such a tale, one long dialectical poem written for the elucidation of justice. In the Laws, where the concern is no longer with an ideal state but with one which is second best,80 the function of the poet and the musician, still rigorously censured, is enlarged. In the Republic he found himself in competition with the dialectician, sadly handicapped by his lack of knowledge; in the Laws he is in competition with the Lawgiver, for the whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which is the very truth of poetry.8s It is not its imitative character but its lack of truth and knowledge which brings poetry to its low estate. Homer and all the poetic tribe are imitators of images of virtue (pLp?)ral el•&oXwv lpvrqs) and of other things, but they do not lay hold on truth. Poetry is a kind of madness comparable to the art of divination or prophecy, or to the art of purification by mysteries, or to that higher madness which seizes the soul when it contemplates in true knowledge, like that of the gods, essence, formless, colorless, intangible. But we are told that when the soul falls from such contemplation it passes first "7 Ibid. iii. 386A. 81 Ibid. vii. 817B. "You are poets and we are poets in the same things, your rivals as artists and actors in the fairest drama, which true law and that alone can carry out, as our hope is."
16

RICHARD McKEON
into a philosopher or a lover; second, into a king or warrior; third, into a householder or money-maker; fourth, into a gymnast; fifth, into a prophet or mystic; sixth, into a poet or imitator; and there are but nine stages in this progressive degradation of the soul.83 The poet, like the interpreter of the poet, may be inspired by a divine gift;84 but like the statesman, who is similarly inspired, he possesses at best only right opinion which is short of knowledge,"' and like Ion, his interpreter, he is repeatedly given the rhapsode's final choice between inspiration and injustice.86 In Aristotle's usage, not only does the term "imitation" have a different definition than it had for Plato but, much more important, Aristotle's method of defining terms and his manner of using them have nothing in common with the devices of the dialogues. There is a double consequence of these differences. Whereas for Plato the. term "imitation" may undergo an infinite series of gradations of meaning, developed in a series of analogies, for Aristotle the term is restricted definitely to a single literal meaning. In the second place and as a consequence of the first difference, whereas for Plato an exposition of the word "imitation" involves an excursion through all the reaches of his philosophy, "imitation" for Aristotle is relevant only to one restricted portion of the domain of philosophy and never extends beyond it. For Plato dialectic is a device by which words, normally opaque, may be made translucent so that a truth and a beauty which are beyond words may shine through them. Though it is a device formulated in terms of words and conceived for the manipulation of words, it is the thing which is held constant; and it is the thing to which the attention of the mind is directed, while the word, on the other hand, varies and is to be discarded once it has served its function as a stage in the progress to truth. Things can be learned, Socrates says,87 either through names or through themselves; but although one may learn from the name, which is a copy (ELKCV), both whether it is a good copy and the truth of which it is a copy, it is better to learn from the truth both the truth itself and whether the copy is properly made. The end of the dialectical process may in a sense be said to be the definition of words, but any word may have many definitions. For Aristotle, on the contrary, the definition of terms and the establishment of principles are the beginnings of the scientific enterprise. Words may have many meanings, and Aristotle frequently enumerates divergent senses of a given word. But in science they must be terms and must therefore be univocal. A term is a word plus a meaning. Consequently, although the Aristotelian sciences are distinguished according to their subject matters, it is the term which is held constant; and a given object, under different aspects isolated by different terms, may move from science to science. As mind, man would be a subject for psychology; as animal, a subject for biology; as natural thing, a subject for physics; as moral agent, a subject for ethics; as tragic actor, a subject for poetics. There results from these two differences a third difference in the fashion in which Plato and Aristotle use words, among others the word "imitation." Plato may ask concerning a given thing in different contexts whether or not it is an imitation, and may arrive in two places, without inconsistency, at two answers, that it is an imitation and that it is not an imitation; for Aristotle, if a given thing is an imitation, it cannot not be an imitation. The method of Aristotle, then, proceeds by the literal definition of terms and by the division of the domain of knowledge into a number of sciences: the theoretical sciences-metaphysics, mathematics, and physics; the practical sciences or the sciences of action-ethics and politics; the "poetic" sciences or the sciences of making; each with its proper principles and, in the case of subordinate sciences, principles derived from superior sciences. Imitation functions in that system as the differentia by which the arts, useful and fine, are dis- 
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RICHARD McKEON partly imitates her.""9 Thus, if a house were a natural product, it would pass through the same stages that it in fact passes through when it is produced by art; and if natural products could also be produced by art, they would move along the same lines that the natural process actually takes. The fine arts differ from the useful in their means of imitation, and consequently in the end of their imitation, for they have no end beyond the perfection of their product as determined by their object and the means they employ. Apart from such differences they are imitations of nature in the same sense as the useful arts. The term, therefore, does not have the scope of application which it possesses in Plato; and such accidental coincidences of verbal expression as occur are in a limited region of philosophy, particularly in the discussion of poetry and most striking in the discussion of dramatic poetry. For Aristotle imitation is not, at one extreme, the imitation of ideas, such as philosophers and the Demiurge indulge in according to Plato; nor is it, at the other extreme, the imitation of appearances themselves imitations, such as satisfies the Platonic poet. Imitation, being peculiar to the processes of art, is not found in the processes of nature or of knowledge. For the natural is that which has an internal principle of motion, whereas the change which is effected in artificial objects is from an external principle. Moreover, for Aristotle imitation is not an imitation of an idea in the mind of the artist; such a statement would be meaningless in the context of the Aristotelian system, though one might properly point out that the forms of the things which proceed from art are in the mind of the artist.90 Rather, imitation is of particular things; the object of imitation, according to the statement of the Poetics99 which seems to be intended to apply to all the fine arts, is the actions of men.
Aristotle says relatively little concerning the process of imitation, and that little has been subject to great differences of interpretation; yet what he says of natural objects and their production and of artificial objects and their making affords sound basis for reconstruction of his theory of imitation. The natural object, composite of form and matter, acts according to the natural principle of its being; in imi- tation the artist separates some form from the matter with which it is joined in nature-not, however, the "substantial" form, but some form perceptible by sensation-and joins it anew to the matter of his art, the medium which he uses. The action which he imitates may be "natural" to the agent, but the artist must attempt to convey not that natural appropriateness and rightness, but rather a "necessity or probability" suitably conveyed by the materials of his art. It is for this reason that "a likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility."92 The analysis might be illustrated from the various arts. The man who sits for his portrait assumes a posture which is determined by the laws of gravitation, by the anatomy of the human body, and the peculiarities of his habits; the painter must justify the line he chooses not in terms of physics or anatomy, but in terms of the composition which appears in the colors and lines on his canvas. A man performs an action as a consequence of his character, his heritage, his fate, or his past actions; the poet represents that action as necessary in his medium, which is words, by developing the man's character, by expressing his thoughts and those of men about him, by narrating incidents. For Aristotle, consequently, imitation may be said to be, in the fine arts, the presentation of an aspect of things in a matter other than its natural matter, rendered inevitable by reasons other than its natural reasons; in the useful arts it is the realization of a function in another matter or under other circumstances than those which are natural. It is no contradiction, consequently, that the artist should imitate natural things, and that he should none the less imitate them "either as they were or are, or as they are said or thought to be or to have been, or as they ought to be.""93 Art imitates nature; the form .joined to matter in the physical world is the same form that is expressed in the matter of the art. Art does not abstract universal forms as science does, but imitates the forms of individual things. Yet, just as the form of man differs from man to man, so the actions of the historical Orestes differ from the actions presented as probable or necessary for Orestes in the plot of a play; and if Orestes had no historical counterpart, the play would still, in this sense of imitation, be an imitation of the actions of men. 
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Whereas the word "imitation" and related words appear in almost every dialogue of Plato, the incidence of the term "imitation" in Aristotle is limited, with the exception of one passage in the Politics, almost entirely to the Poetics. It is the imitative element in his work that makes the poet a poet.94 The various arts and the various kinds of poetry may be distinguished as modes of imitation; and therefore, approaching the problem in his accustomed scientific orderliness, Aristotle considers the arts according to the differences in the means, the objects, and the manners of their imitations. In the Poetics he has occasion to treat only of the arts which use rhythm, language, and harmony as their means of imitation, though color and form are mentioned as other means.95 Flute-playing and lyre-playing use a combination of harmony and rhythm. The dance, with only rhyttms and attitudes, can represent men's characters as well as what they do and suffer. The mime and the dialogue imitate by language alone without harmony. Other arts, including the dithyramb, the nome, tragedy, and comedy, combine all three means-rhythm, melody, and verse--differing from each other, however, in their manner of employment of these means. The object of imitation is the actions of men. With the differences of agents, the actions themselves are differentiated; and painters, musicians, and dancers can be distinguished and described according to the characters they represent. In this respect tragedy differs from comedy in that it makes its characters better rather than worse than the run of men. Given the same means and object of imitation, finally, two poems may differ in manner of imitation. One poet may speak at one moment in his own person, at another in the person of his characters, as Homer did; another poet may speak in a single person without change throughout; or in the third place the imitators may represent the whole story dramatically, as though they were actually doing the things described." The familiar classification of the kinds of poetry thus recurs much as it appeared in Plato, and on this most concrete of the levels of Plato's dialectic Aristotle seems to come closest to the statement of his master. Yet, important distinctions must be made between the two statements. For Plato it is "4 Ibid. 9. 14516b28; 1. 1447b15. 
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a classification of three kinds of poetry: that which is effected by pure narrative, that which is effected by imitation, and the mixed kind which is effected by both. The preference is for the "unmixed imitator of the good."97 Aristotle's distinction is among the manners of imitation in poems whose object and means of imitation are the same; to the other aspects of poetic imitation one further imitative characteristic is added. The question of preference among the various types is reserved for a later place,98 and takes the form of the question whether the epic or the tragic is the higher form of imitation, the unmixed form not being considered. Moreover, the choice is made, not on moral but on literary grounds, because tragedy attains the poetic effect better than the epic. Aristotle is engaged in making literal distinctions, within the field of imitative art, of imitative devices and characteristics; dramatic imitation is one further imitative device to be added to other aspects of poetic imitation; his terms do not change their meanings, and his criteria are derived from a restricted field of discussion without reference beyond. Plato, on the other hand, applies the word "imitation" by means of the proportion of the real to appearance: relative to the narrative, drama is imitation; relative to the good, narrative too is imitation. No restricted field of literature with criteria peculiar to itself is indicated; rather, the proportions mark off at each application portions of the whole of things, real and apparent, and the criteria, envisaging the perfection of being which man might attain in that whole, are moral.
These primary distinctions serve a function in Aristotle's analysis comparable to that of the first principles of a science, although poetics is not a theoretic science and, like ethics and politics, it has no first principles in the precise sense in which Aristotle uses that term. These, however, are fundamental distinctions derived from the subject matter with which the inquiry is concerned, and they supply the apparatus about which the analysis of poetry is organized. There are six "parts" of tragedy: three-plot, character, and thought-determined by the object of imitation; two--diction and melody--determined by the means of imitation; one-spectacle--determined by the manner of imitation. For Aristotle, as for Plato, the object of 97 Republic ill. 387D. O9 Poetics 26. 14616b26 ft.
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imitation is of primary importance; but that statement has a different significance in the context of Aristotle's analysis. In the dialogues it directed our attention from earthly things to eternal objects of imitation; in the Poetics it focuses discussion on the plot as an imitation of the actions of men. The plot is "the first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy."99 The poet must be more the poet of his plots than of his verses, for he is a poet by virtue of the imitative element in his work, and it is actions that he imitates.'00 Character and thought follow in importance in the order named, and of the remaining three parts of the tragedy only diction is given extended discussion. The conditions of art, therefore, by which its representations are rendered necessary or probable are derived primarily from the object of imitation, and the discussion of tragedy in the Poetics is concerned largely with plot and character. Even the unity so essential to the work of art is not unrelated to its object of imitation, since "one imitation is always of one thing."'0' Some of the conditions of art, as derived from the actions of men, pertain to the nature of art in general; some, derived from actions of a given kind, are specific to the art forms that are devoted to that kind; some conditions derived from the means of imitation, similarly, are generic to several kinds of art, as the devices of rhythm are used in poetry, music, and the dance; some are specific to particular arts, tone to music, words to poetry, color to painting.
In Plato it proved to be impossible to consider art without regard to its moral and political effects. Aristotle is no less aware of those effects and their implications; but in virtue of his method, whatever pertains to the subject of a particular science is reserved for treatment in that science. Tragedy may be used as a political instrumentality in the state or it may reflect political doctrines or motivations in its speeches: in either case, it does not function as a work of art but is properly treated among the problems of politics and rhetoric. Art in the state and thought in the drama are subjects which Aristotle apparently does not consider parts of the subject matter of the Poetics, for the first would need to be referred to the principles of political "9 Ibid. 6. 1450s38. other an aesthetic utterance, would be an error comparable to looking for evolution or refutation between the statements of the Republic and the Laws, without recognizing that the one has reference to a perfect state, the other to a state possible to men as they are. In the Aristotelian approach the aspects of things are distinguished from each other and treated independently; the major branches of the sciences are separated, and within each branch the major subdivisions; and since imitation is the differentia of art, and since the fine arts are further differentiated from the useful arts by their ends and their means, and since finally the fine arts are distinguished from each other by their respective means and the objects appropriate to those means, it follows not only that there is a branch of knowledge whose subject matter is the products of the arts, but also that each of the arts may be the subject properly for like investigation. The Poetics is such an examination of poetry in itself, not in its relation to education, morals, statesmanship, nature, or being. In Plato's analysis, on the other hand, art cannot be considered in isolation; it is one of the numerous strands of man's life and takes its importance and meaning from those strands; it bears analogies to all the other arts, to the phenomena of nature and the actions of the gods; distinctions in art parallel those of education, of science, of moral, social, and political life; in the dialectical examination of all these activities the same contraries are employed, the one and the many, being and becoming, the true and the false, knowledge and belief, the fair and the foul, and all of them involve imitation. Art is, therefore, never dissociated in the Platonic approach from the full context of life; and it is always subject to moral, political, educational, and scientific criticism, for there can be no other, no purely aesthetic, criticism of art.
The Platonic and the Aristotelian approaches to the consideration of art differ, therefore, not in the manner of two doctrines which contradict each other, but rather in the manner of two approaches to a subject which are mutually incommensurable. Even more, the differences of the two approaches and the peculiarities of the two methods indicate no superiority of the one over the other, nor are problems soluble by the one which are impervious to the analysis of the other. Although there is no place for distinct sciences, independent of each other, in Plato, there are none the less abundant devices by which to make distinctions; and likewise, although all problems are assigned to their proper scientific context in Aristotle and although each science has its proper domain, its proper scope, and frequently methodological devices peculiar to itself, knowledge is not hopelessly atomized, for there are devices by which to consider phenomena in the context of all the varieties of problems. There are complementary dangers, moreover, in cross-references from one work of either of these philosophers to another. Plato never employs one dialectical strand alone: in the Republic and the Laws poetry is treated by means of analogies drawn successively from the numerous strands of political life; in the Phaedrus the analogies bind it to the other arts, particularly to the art of rhetoric; in the Ion it appears in connection with the divine gift of inspiration. Moreover, even between the Republic and the Laws the analogies have shifted-as indeed they shift from book to book within each of those works-for the context of one is the idea of a perfect state, the other the construction of a state short of perfection with specific social, economic, and political characteristics.
What is said about poetry in one of these contexts cannot be taken to be literally the same or literally contradictory to what is said of poetry in any of the other contexts. Just as the meaning in each dialogue is brought out by a dialectical development, so the translation from dialogue to dialogue requires similar dialectical modification. The doctrine of Plato concerning poetry cannot be built up by collecting quotations in which the word "poetry" appears throughout his works; the result of such an enterprise indeed is no doctrine whatever but, as the history of criticism has abundantly illustrated, a collection of inconsistent statements. Contrariwise, whereas in Plato's treatment the concepts of art and imitation are generalized or particularized to various dialectical contexts, in Aristotle the treatment of art and imitation, considered in their own right and in their proper science, may be supplemented by a consideration of them as they impinge on the problems of other sciences, on grammar, rhetoric, logic, ethics, politics, physics, psychology, or metaphysics. But to collect from the works concerned with the various sciences quotations in which the words "imitation" or "poetry" or "art" appear, with the intention to place them one after the other and so find in them a coherent doctrine, results in an assemblage of statements as confused as the corresponding collections from the dialogues of Plato. As the statements of Plato require dialectical approximation to each other, the statements of Aristotle require the intrusion of proper principles from the appropriate sciences to permit transition from one to the other.
In Aristotle the term "imitation" is given a literal meaning and is limited in application to works of human art; in Plato the meaning is developed and contracted in analogies so that the word cannot be said to have determined application but is sometimes more general, sometimes more restricted, than any use in Aristotle. The word was used in still other senses by other writers in antiquity, but considerations of method are not so important in the fashions of their usage, and the systematic implications are not subtle. None of the writers on literature employed the dialectical method of Plato in any but a highly attenuated and faltering manner. Their definitions are literal like those of Aristotle, but in their writings the term "imitation" does not appear in a context of subject matters distributed in various scientific disciplines. Rather, the meanings in which they use the term are derived for the most part from one of the meanings which it assumed in Plato's dialogues, usually degraded and rendered static or, what amounts to the same thing, in a meaning which "imitation" might have had if Aristotle had used it in some other work than the Poetics, as, for example, the Rhetoric.
A third variant to the meanings of Plato and Aristotle may therefore be said to derive from the tradition of writers on rhetoric. In age, this view is at least contemporary with the other two, and it has perhaps an even longer and certainly less distorted history since the age of Plato. "For the rest" Isocrates says,1'4 "he [the teacher] must in himself set such an example (rapaciyua) , that the students who are molded ((Krv7Uoi3v) by him and are able to imitate (uAtpicaaaOat) him will, from the outset, show in their speaking a degree of grace and charm greater than that of others." Though Aristotle wrote a Rhetoric (and, if Cicero and Quintilian are correct, justified himself in teaching rhetoric by turning a scathing epigram against Isocrates), 104 Against the Sophists 18. he confines his attention to the analysis of the means of persuasion available to the orator and finds no place for aphorisms concerning the imitation of past orators. He does say that man is the most imitative of animals and learns at first by imitation;105 he distinguishes repeatedly in his works between sciences, which are acquired by learning; virtues, which are acquired by habituation; and arts, which are acquired by practice (6'iKGtrns). It would be easier to find analogies in Plato for Isocrates' use of the term; but for Plato it would have that meaning only as applied to early education, for in maturity one would imitate, not the poet but him who knows. Strictly even then imitation is of the virtues and the truth, not of the wise man. Yet imitation in this rhetorical sense, imitation of other artists, continued to be used in the writings of rhetoricians and orators. Cicero frequently recommends the imitation of good models, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus composed a treatise On imitation, preserved unfortunately only in fragments, which he tells us consisted of three parts, the first on imitation in general, the second on the choice of writers for imitation (including poets, philosophers, historians, and orators), the third on the proper methods of imitation. The last subject, which was never completed by Dionysius, is one to which Quintilian returns,106 for to his mind there are three essentials in the formation of the ideal orator-power of speech, imitation, and diligence of writing.'07 Imitation alone, to be sure, is not enough,'0s for invention must precede imitation, and the greatest qualities of the orator, including invention, are beyond imitation.'09 One should consider, Quintilian says, first whom to imitate, second what to imitate in the authors chosen.110 Imitation, he reminds us, should not be confined merely to words; one should consider also the appropriateness with which orators handle circumstances and persons, their
